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Economic Growth and Poverty: 
Does Formalisation of Informal Enterprises Matter? 
Abstract 
The informal sector (IS) plays a significant role in developing countries viz. the provision 
of employment, income and supplying ignored markets. However, working and employ-
ment conditions within the sector are still poor. Its expansion and changing structures 
have thus drawn the attention of scholars and international policy makers to the factors 
hindering its formalisation. Among the factors addressed are the high costs of formalisa-
tion and the lack of incentives for operating in the formal sector. A variety of approaches 
have been adopted by different stakeholders to overcome these factors. This paper as-
sesses these approaches along with the factors related to informality-formality trade-off 
and the issue of formalisation as a solution for firms’ growth. By focussing on the prob-
lems faced by informal enterprises and the literature which addresses the options for ac-
celerating the formalisation of informal enterprises, the paper will briefly summarise the 
weaknesses of these approaches. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wirtschaftswachstum und Arbeit:  
Welche Bedeutung hat die Formalisierung informeller Unternehmen? 
In Entwicklungsländern spielt der informelle Sektor (IS) eine bedeutende Rolle für Be-
schäftigung und Einkommen sowie in der Versorgung ansonsten missachteter Märkte. 
Gleichwohl sind Arbeits- und Beschäftigungsbedingungen in diesem Sektor in der Regel 
schlecht. Angesichts der Ausweitung und Veränderung der Strukturen des IS fragen da-
her Wissenschaftler wie politische Entscheidungsträger nach den Faktoren, die seine For-
malisierung verhindern. Hierzu zählen unter anderem die hohen Kosten der Formalisie-
rung sowie fehlende Anreize dafür, im formalen Sektor der Ökonomie zu operieren. Um 
diese Hindernisse zu überwinden, werden eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Ansätze ange-
wandt. Dieser Beitrag analysiert diese Ansätze und fragt nach den Faktoren, die für die 
Entscheidung zwischen Formalisierung oder Verbleib im IS ausschlaggebend sind sowie 
nach der Bedeutung der Formalisierung für das Wachstum eines Unternehmens. Auf der 
Basis der Analyse der Probleme informeller Unternehmen sowie der Literatur über die 
Optionen zur Beschleunigung ihres Formalisierungsprozesses werden abschließend die 
Schwächen der verschiedenen Ansätze skizziert. 
 Article Outline 
 
1. Introduction 
2. The Informal Sector: An Overview 
3. Barriers to Entry into the Formal Sector 
4. The Informal Sector, Economic Growth and Poverty 
5. Strategic Options: Accelerating the Formalisation of Informal Enterprises 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The contribution of the informal sector (IS) to the economy and its expansion in the develop-
ing countries has drawn the attention of both scholars and policy makers. The sector plays 
an intermediate role linking formal sub-sectors to consumers (Mlinga and Wells, 2002). It 
supplies the low and middle income employees of the formal sector with products and ser-
vices not offered by the formal sector. In 1998 the sector accounted for 40-60 percent of ur-
ban employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Xaba, 2002). In 1990 it supplied approxi-
mately 25 percent of urban jobs in Latin America, while in Asia it accounted for between 10 
and 65 percent (Sethuraman, 1997). According to the employment structure of the IS, self-
employment offers more jobs than wage-employment the former accounting for 70 percent 
in SSA, 60 percent in North Africa, 60 percent in Latin America and 58 percent in Asia 
(Becker, 2004). However, self-employment is sometimes referred to as a community of the 
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poor or non-dynamic sub-IS (e.g. House, 1984; Djankov, 2002). This has triggered concerns 
among policy makers regarding the status of the IS and its relation to increasing poverty 
(ILO, 2004).  
Apart from the aforementioned contributions, working conditions and income levels in the IS 
are still low and thus trap the actors in poverty. The hindrances to the growth of informal en-
terprises most frequently identified include: intra-firm factors – limited human and working 
capital,1 poor location and the utilisation of obsolete technology; external factors – limited ac-
cess to market, financial and business support services, complex and burdensome government 
regulations, a lack of economic infrastructure and a poor supply of public services;2 and inter-
firm factors – exploitative linkage relationships (Tokman, 1978; Gerry, 1978), limited forward 
linkages (Kappel et al., 2004; Arimah, 2001; Adam, 1995), non-innovative networking activities 
(Barr, 1998) and weak IS business associations (McCormick, 1999).  
Several studies have reported on factors that impede the formalisation of the IS emphasising 
the high costs of formalisation and the lack of incentives for operating in the formal sector.3 
Various approaches have been adopted by stakeholders in order to overcome these prob-
lems and this paper aims to assess these approaches and the factors related to informality-
formality trade-off as well as the matter of formalisation as a solution for firms’ growth. By 
deliberating over the problems faced by informal enterprises and the literature addressing 
the options for accelerating the formalisation of informal enterprises, the paper will briefly 
summarise the weaknesses of these approaches. 
From this point the paper is organised into six sections: Section 2 conceptualises the infor-
mality of a firm and highlights factors hindering the growth of informal enterprises. Sec-
tion 3 addresses barriers to entry into the formal sector with a special focus on the costs of 
formalisation and the opportunity costs of informality. Section 4 tries to associate informal-
ity with poverty and economic growth. Based on the views of scholars and donor and gov-
ernmental initiatives, Section 5 describes measures taken to accelerate the formalisation 
process. Section 6 is a conclusion and offers recommendations. 
 
 
                                                     
1  The Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Youth (1991). 
2  See Morrisson (1995), Arimah (2001), Kappel et al. (2004), and Klein 2003 on limited financial ser-
vices; Yu (2002), Ishengoma (2005), and Morrisson (1995) on poor business location and high cost 
of utilities. 
3  De Soto (1992), Loayza (1997); Djankov et al. (2002), Levenson and Maloney (1998), IBRD/World 
Bank (2005), Jaeckle and Li (2003), and Ishengoma (2005). 
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2. The Informal Sector: An Overview 
Conceptualising the Informality of a Firm 
What is the Informal Sector? 
The term IS was first introduced by Keith Hart (1973). The informality of firms has since 
been described in relation to interrelated aspects: compliance with government regulations 
(viz. registration, payment of tax and adherence to labour regulations); size of the firm; firm-
level resource endowment and applied technology (labour or capital intensive), location, the 
physical place of operation and the characteristics of workforce and ownership. Tokman 
(2001) defines the IS as comprising firms with limited ownership (i.e. self-employed) that 
utilise unpaid family members, domestic servants, less educated employees, and have less 
than five workers (including the owner). Loayza (1997) views the sector as a set of economic 
units that do not comply totally or partially with government regulations.  
The descriptions of informal firms according to their size are not concordant. Some scholars 
(e.g. Arimah, 2001) apply a cut-off point of ten people and others five employees (e.g. Tok-
man, 1978). Furthermore, some scholars relate the IS to micro or small enterprises (MSE) 
without stating how small a firm should be in order for it to be categorised as informal (e.g. 
Mlinga and Wells, 2002; Anderson, 1998). Their views are based on the premise that the ma-
jority of firms in these size categories are not likely to comply with government regulations.4 
However, there are smaller, registered firms which have permanent locations and adhere to 
some government regulations5 while not all large firms abide by every government regula-
tion, particularly labour regulations (Mlinga and Wells, 2002; Tokman, 2001). Some firms 
can be defined as semi-informal, since they keep parts of their business informal (Djankov, 
2002) and utilise casual/unrecorded contractual labour.  
The reviewed studies utilised a limited number of attributes that are easy to empirically 
conceptualise. The definition of the IS with regards adherence to government regulations 
however, seems difficult to conceptualise. Since informality in developing countries cuts 
across all size categories, some scholars (e.g. Morrisson, 1995) prefer to use the term ‘micro-
enterprises’ instead of informal enterprises, while others (e.g. Mlinga and Wells, 2002) avoid 
the definition of informal enterprises as far as compliance with government regulations and 
particularly labour regulations is concerned. 
                                                     
4  Several studies (e.g. Levenson and Maloney, 1998; Morrisson, 1995) reveal that the level of adher-
ence to government regulations is positively related to the size of the firm. 
5  For example, some self-employed, small and micro-firms identified by authors (e.g. Tokman, 2001) 
as informal are registered by local and/or national authorities and pay taxes to them (Arimah, 
2001) and some utilising paid workers have registered them with the social security administra-
tion (Levenson and Maloney, 1998; Morrisson, 1995). 
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Recent studies on the IS emphasise the consideration of IS heterogeneity instead of concep-
tualising informality in a dichotomous way (i.e. formal or informal) which gives little insight 
into the sector. They report that not all firms categorised as informal follow the survival 
strategy. Indeed, some comprise characteristics similar to those of small formal firms 
(Mlinga and Wells, 2002) while others utilise relatively modern/sophisticated technology 
and educated workers (Ranis and Stewart, 1999; House, 1984). Levenson and Maloney 
(1998), for example, report diverse levels of formality among firms in the IS. The following 
section discusses the classification of the IS.  
 
Classifications of the Informal Sector 
Through emphasis on the role of the level of establishment characterised by a firm’s ability 
to compete, Mlinga and Wells (2002) organize the IS into three sub-sectors: the characteris-
tics of established informal firms (e.g. investment in equipment, registration requirements, 
ability to compete with formal small firms for formal private clients) are similar to those of 
small formal firms; emerging informal firms; firms supplying labour inputs only. Table 1 
contains this categorisation together with the following approaches to classification and 
shows, through the indication of the arrow, the potential of the firms to integrate into the 
formal sector. 
Ranis and Stewart (1999) use the firms resource endowment (the average level of human 
capital, the level of development of the technology utilised) and marketing channels (i.e. 
selling directly to final consumers or to large buyers) to classify the sector as traditional or 
modern, the latter having relatively high resource endowment and linked to relatively large 
buyers. House (1984) considers the motivation of the entrepreneurs to start a business to be 
an additional aspect with which to classify the IS and identifies three sub-sectors: the inter-
mediate/dynamic IS is more business-oriented and characterised by a relatively high aver-
age IS income, educated workers, and subcontracting arrangements with the formal sector; 
the community of the poor is subsistence-oriented and its characteristics are opposite to 
those of the formal sub-sector; the transitional sub-sector falls between the previous two 
sub-sectors. Meagher (1995) identifies three categories in the IS: the survival informal group 
whose actors have an income equal to that of informal wage labour; dependent workers op-
erating as commissioned sellers; and genuine entrepreneurs who are part of the modern 
informal sector. 
Djankov et al. (2002) categorise the IS as subsistence and unofficial enterprises based on the 
potential enterprises have to graduate into the formal sector. The former are characterised as 
possessing low potential, short-lived and experiencing higher failure rates while the latter, 
although engaging in some unofficial activities or using unreported employees, have rela-
tively high potential, are modern/dynamic and are likely to be formally registered.  
  
Table 1: Informal sector typologies 
Informal sector Formal sector Informal sector 
Subsistence enterprises Unofficial enterprises 
Attributes Subsistence  
enterprises Unofficial enterprises Official enterprises Traditionala/stagnant/ 
community of the poorb 
Emergingc/
transitionb 
Moderna/dynamicb/ 
well establishedc 
Degree of  
informality 100%* 
High. Proportion of sales 
undeclared and workers 
not registered 
Some proportion of sales  
undeclared and workers unregis-
tered. May use outside the offi-
cial purview (e.g. internet to 
deliver software) 
Highd  
Mixed and specific to 
institutionsd 
Types of activity 
Single street traders, 
cottage/micro enter-
prises, subsistence 
farmers  
Small manufacturers, 
service providers,  
distributors, contractors  
Small and medium manufactur-
ers, service providers, software 
firms  
Labourer contractorc   
Established contractors 
similar to small formal 
contractorc  
Manufacturingb  
Technology Labour intensive Mostly labour intensive Knowledge and capital intensive 
High labour intensivea,b,c  
Rudimentary equipmenta,b 
 
Relatively labour  
intensivea,b,c  
Modern equipmenta,b 
Owner profile 
Poor, low education, 
low level of skills 
Poor and non-poor, well 
educated, high level of 
skills 
Non-poor, highly educated, 
sophisticated level of skills 
Low skillsa,b  
Non-business orienteda,b,c  
 
Relatively high skills a,b  
Business orienteda,b,c 
Markets 
Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, 
high product homoge-
neity 
Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, some 
product differentiation 
Significant barriers to entry, 
established market/product niche 
Sell to local/low income 
final consumersa,b,c   
Some linkages with  
formal onesa,b,c 
Finance needs Working capital 
Working capital, some 
investment capital,  
supplier credit  
Investment capital and working 
capital, letters of credit, supplier 
credit 
Working capitala,b,c  
Some investment in 
equipmentc 
Other needs 
Personal insurance, 
social protection 
Personal and perhaps 
business insurance 
Personal and business insurance, 
business development services    
  
 Least dynamic 
Completely informal 
 
Highly dynamic 
Partially formal 
Stagnant  Relatively dynamic 
* In line with this observation, Morrisson (1995) reports that the majority of self employed people in seven countries surveyed were not registered and paid no tax. 
a Ranis and Stewart, 1999; b House, 1984; c Mlinga and Wells , 2002; d Levenson and Maloney, 1998. 
Source: Djankov et al., 2002. 
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The Establishment and Growth of the Informal Sector  
The establishment and growth of the IS is related to a number of factors including the fol-
lowing:  
 
Decline in Economic Performance/Non-pro-poor Economic Growth  
It has been argued that when the economic growth rate of a region or nation declines, firms 
in the formal sector tend to contract by retrenching employees in order to cut-down their 
operating costs (Ranis and Stewart, 1999). Retrenched workers then seek alternative sources 
of income, which mostly turn out to be informal businesses (Tokman, 2001). The expansion 
of the IS and the deteriorating employment situation in many developing countries in SSA, 
Latin America and the Caribbean are associated with low GDP growth rates (ILO, 2004). 
Many of these countries have also faced high population growth rates and increasing num-
bers of job-seekers particularly among the youth (see ILO, 2004; UNDP, 2001; Anderson, 
1998). 
However, an increase in the economic growth rate of a country does not automatically result 
in the movement of workers from the IS to the formal sector. Despite high GDP growth rates 
(over 7 percent) some East Asian countries have faced an increase in unemployment. In the 
1990s China underwent the highest economic growth rate (GDP per capita annual growth 
rate of 9.5 percent) (UNDP, 2001) yet between 1996 and 1999 experienced a 28 per cent de-
crease of employment in state owned enterprises, a more than 50 percent decrease of female 
workers in urban collective enterprises and a 41 per cent increase of own-account workers 
and employees in micro-enterprises.6 Similarly, Latin America experienced economic recov-
ery and growth in the 1990s but it still faced an increase in unemployment (Becker, 2004). 
Based on these findings, Becker emphasises that economic growth may negatively affect the 
size of the IS only if it is pro-poor, meaning if it is accompanied by improvements in formal 
employment levels and income distribution. 
 
Rural-urban Migration  
Between the 1970s and 1980s, the agricultural sector was the main area of occupation in 
most developing countries. In 1975, 79 percent of the population in some of these countries 
was to be found in rural areas. The fall in world market prices of primary products however, 
coupled with decreasing agricultural output, reduced agricultural income and increased 
unequal regional development in these countries; factors which contributed to the heighten-
ing of rural-urban migration. Between 1975 and 1999 the annual growth rate of the popula-
                                                     
6  Ministry of Labour and Social Security, People’s Republic of China (2002). 
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tion in urban areas of low income countries was 6 percent, higher than that of both rural 
areas (2 percent) and of the total population (2.2 percent).7 Rising rural-urban migration 
augments the supply of low-skilled labour in the cities resulting in an expansion of the ur-
ban-IS due to the limited capacity of the formal sector to absorb job-seekers.8 Indeed, a 
household survey on the Tanzanian IS indicates that the proportion of households engaged 
in the IS is higher in urban areas (around 56 percent) than in rural areas (15 percent in rural 
areas).9 Besides rural-urban migration, the unsatisfied demand for services and products 
benefiting medium and low income earners in urban areas may explain the difference in the 
rural- and urban-proportion of households involved in the IS.10 
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)  
The implementation of SAPs has expanded the IS on account of the following reasons: the 
decrease of real wages in the formal sector (Anderson, 1998) has raised the cost of living, 
thus forcing household members (particularly women) to engage in the IS and supplement 
the households’ income (Ishengoma, 2004). Furthermore, the privatisation of state owned 
enterprises has resulted in job-retrenchment;11 while trade liberalisation has contributed to 
the contraction and closure of some formal enterprises which were unable to compete given 
the availability of cheap imports (Becker, 2004). As social security systems in the majority of 
developing countries are poor, retrenched people are forced into self- or wage-employment 
in the IS as alternative sources of income (ILO, 2004).  
 
Disintegration of Production and Integration of Trade 
Globalisation has led to the disintegration of production and the integration of trade, whereby 
global buyers are outsourcing some of their activities in labour advantageous regions. This has 
led to the retrenchment of workers (the majority being low-skilled) who had been involved in 
the activities being outsourced (Feenstra, 1998). In countries with poor social security systems, 
low-skilled retrenched workers are likely to be involved in informal activities. The increasing 
concentration of global buyers has strengthened their bargaining power but rising numbers of 
suppliers/producers in the upper part of the value chains have weakened their position. The 
increasing pressure applied by global buyers on producers to raise quality and reduces costs 
has resulted in the casualisation of their workers (Nadvi, 2004).  
                                                     
7  United Nations Development Program (2001). 
8  See Becker (2004), Anderson (1998).  
9  The Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Youth (1991).  
10  See Anderson (1998) for the case of Mongolian urban informal sector. 
11  For example, in Mongolia between 1990 and 1995 employment in privatised industries fell by 50 
percent (Anderson, 1998). 
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Factors Hindering the Growth of Informal Enterprises  
The factors hindering the performance of informal enterprises can be categorised as internal, 
external and inter-firm factors. Although several studies address the first two categories, the 
latter is not well covered which may limit initiatives taken to overcome the factors compris-
ing the first two categories (Sethuramann, 1997).  
 
Internal Factors 
The internal factors which hinder the functioning of informal enterprises include: limited 
human capital (the skills and motivation of employees), lack of working capital, the utilisa-
tion of obsolete technology and poor location. Regarding factors pertaining to human capi-
tal, several studies indicate that the majority of workers in informal enterprises are of low 
education. In the Tanzanian informal sector for example, 65 percent of employees were pri-
mary school leavers, while the majority of employers had higher than primary school educa-
tion.12 In terms of poor location, the majority of women-owned informal firms are home-
based which may limit their expansion, interaction with other businesses, hence increased 
transaction costs and limited access to marketing information. Some informal enterprises 
operate in temporary physical structures, a situation that limits their access to public ser-
vices: sanitation, water and electricity. The internal sources of funds/working capital are 
insignificant as the majority of informal firms (particularly subsistence enterprises) generate 
low incomes which are distributed between households and businesses. 
 
External Factors 
Access to financial services. In developing countries, the majority of MSEs lack access to formal 
financial services. Between the years 1995 and 2004 only nine percent of informal enterprises 
in Jamaica and ten percent in Tunisia had access to bank loans (Morrisson, 1995). Other Afri-
can countries experienced similar circumstances for instance; only ten percent of informal 
firms in Nigeria and four percent in Uganda had access to bank loans (Arimah, 2001; Kappel 
et al., 2004). The firms accessibility to funds from micro-finance institutions was much lower 
(Arimah, 2001; Kappel et al., 2004). In Nigeria, funds offered by some MFIs were in a small 
way relevant for the subsistence IS but not high enough for profitable investments (Adam 
1995). In Tanzania it appears to be more expensive to borrow from MFIs than formal finan-
cial institutions (Ishengoma, 2005). 
The majority of economically vulnerable actors in the IS have no access to social and busi-
ness security insurance services. This may trap them into risk minimising strategies related 
                                                     
12  The Planning Commission and the Ministry of Labour and Youth (1991). 
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to limited business growth (McCormick, 1999, Klein, 2003; Kappel, 2004). Moreover, the li-
ability institutions that could protect entrepreneurs from loss in the instance of business 
failure are inaccessible to informal firms (Klein, 2003). 
Limited access to business development services (BDS). Since informal firms do not comply with 
all government regulations the majority of them have no access to BDS offered/coordinated 
by governments. Some of these firms are unaware that BDS are offered in their locality while 
others are ignorant to their worth. It is also stated that BDS providers do not market their 
services to small and informal enterprises appropriately, assuming that these enterprises can 
not afford the services. It can also be the case that the services offered are of low quality or 
irrelevant to SMEs.13 
Limited market. The majority of informal enterprises target the low income market because it 
is associated with low entry barriers. Enterprises in this market tend to compete for the same 
customers, a state of affairs which the majority of MSEs indicated as a major obstacle to the 
running of businesses in Uganda (Kappel et al., 2004). The magnitude of this hindrance is 
higher for those concentrated in one area as they tend to apply a copycat strategy and thus 
produce similar products. This limits their growth potential and stability and is one of the 
reasons why micro or informal enterprises experience a relatively high instance of downfall. 
Poor supply of economic infrastructure and public services. The majority of informal firms lack a 
decent location for their businesses. Some of them are located in places with a limited sup-
ply or lack of public services and economic infrastructure (for example, water and electric-
ity, transport systems, telecommunication systems, hygiene services). In comparison to resi-
dents/enterprises in middle or high-income communities, informal firms with access to these 
services incur a relatively high cost per unit for the service (Yu, 2002). On account of their 
small size they can not afford to invest in private public goods (Reinikka and Svensson, 
2002) or to buy services from private providers which would be more expensive than sourc-
ing from government suppliers (Ishengoma, 2005). A poor economic infrastructure and lim-
ited access to public services increases the operating costs of informal firms, limits their abil-
ity to meet quality standards (for example, hygiene standards in restaurants), hinders their 
participation in linkage relationships (Collier, 2000) and reduces their market and customer 
base.  
Complex and burdensome government regulations. Conducting business in less developed coun-
tries is difficult due to complex and burdensome government regulations. These issues will 
be described in Section 4.  
                                                     
13  See www.danishembassy-ghana.dk/documents/Component%203.pdf. 
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Inter-firm Factors 
The nature of linkage relationships. The nature of the linkage relationships that seem to exist in 
developing countries is one whereby large, formal enterprises supply input to informal en-
terprises. These linkages are regarded as exploitative (Arimah, 2001). The forward linkages 
(i.e. informal enterprises supplying formal ones) while reported to have a positive effect on 
the performance of informal firms, are not very prominent in developing countries.14 Even 
government organisations crowd out informal enterprises depriving them of their linkages 
with the private sector. Only 7 percent of informal business in Nigeria (Arimah, 2001) and 10 
to 20 percent in Algeria, Tunisia, Thailand, Ecuador and Jamaica had access to the market 
for public procurement orders (Morrisson, 1995). Limited linkages between the formal and 
IS are among the factors that explain low competency in the IS, especially in the case of 
manufacturing firms which rely on an exchange of information and skills with the formal 
sector (Adam, 1995) given the insufficient supply of BDS. 
Governance structures. As a result of the inadequate capabilities of the firms and their weak 
legal status, the majority of informal enterprises involved in bilateral vertical linkages with 
formal enterprises have relatively low bargaining power. Consequently they will likely be 
exploited (Tokman, 1978) and incur relatively high transaction costs. Gerry (1978) reported 
on the limited ability of Dakar’s informal shoemakers to accumulate wealth and to grow; 
functioning under the dominance of monopolistic formal suppliers and buyers, they were 
squeezed from both sides. He asserted that when there are different layers of contractors 
such as original formal contractors, entrepreneurs (some of whom act as brokers) and la-
bourers, firms in the first category accrue more profit by shirking their responsibility to 
cover social labour securities, whilst those in the last category are highly exploited. 
Weak associations. Given the unlimited supply of labour, worker associations tend to have 
little bargaining power.15 Family members working in informal enterprises however do not 
campaign for their rights, viz., the improvement of working conditions. This in turn may 
lead to the exploitation of informal workers by their employers, hence increased informality. 
Poor employment and working conditions also lessen the productivity of informal enter-
prises resulting in lower wages. 
                                                     
14  The Nigerian informal sector sources about 40 and 23 percent of material inputs and equipment 
from large domestic and foreign-based companies respectively; but its supply limited percentages 
to the formal sector (i.e. less than 10 percent) (Arimah, 2001). The percentages of informal enter-
prises that had subcontracting arrangements with large enterprises between the mid 1990s and 
2000s is less than 10 percent in Nigeria (Arimah, 2001) and only 20 percent in Uganda (Kappel et 
al., 2004). House (1984) indicates a positive effect of subcontracting arrangements on the operating 
income of informal firms. Milinga and Wells (2002) emphasize the role of these arrangements in 
improving the management skills of informal enterprises.  
15  See www.sewa.org/aboutus/index.htm. 
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3. Barriers to Entry into the Formal Sector 
While some informal firms operate informally because they cannot meet the costs of forma-
lisation, others (modern and transitional informal firms) operate partially or totally infor-
mally despite being able to meet some of the formal requirements (Mlinga and Wells, 2002). 
Modern and transitional informal firms appear to make a choice between formality and in-
formality after having compared the costs and benefits of formalisation (Loayza, 1997; 
Djankov et al., 2002). When the costs of being formal are higher than the benefits, firms are 
more likely to operate informally and vice versa. Such firms also seem to choose the degree 
of participation and types of societal institutions based on the benefits they accrue from 
them (Djankov et al., 2002; Levenson and Maloney, 1998). The following sections address 
barriers to entry into the formal sector based on the cost-benefit approach.  
 
Cost of Formalisation 
Like De Soto (1992), Loayza (1997) categorises the costs of formalising an enterprise into 
formal entry and operating costs.  
 
Entry Costs 
When a firm decides to become formal, it has to be registered as a company and pay a li-
cence fee. During the registration process the firm may undergo several procedures (viz., 
screening, health and safety certificates, registration with statistical offices, local authorities 
and respective ministries) in order to meet the official requirements. The number of proce-
dures and the level of efficiency among the offices involved in the registration process differ 
from country to country. In East African countries the registration process entails 11 to 17 
procedures, takes about 35 to 61 days, and costs between US$ 194 and 339 (Table 2). In some 
Latin American countries the process involves 9 to 18 procedures, takes about 67 to 100 days 
and costs from US$ 510 to 1,499. In transition economies the screening process involves 7 to 
20 procedures and takes between 22 and 105 business days. The average number of proce-
dures in the world is 6.26 (Djankov et al., 2002). In some developed countries the registration 
of a new business can be accomplished without involving many procedures and requiring 
only a small number of resources. In New York and Florida it takes approximately four and 
three-and-half hours respectively (Loayza, 1997). Inefficiency and corruption are part of the 
explanation for why less developed countries, despite their fewer resources, have more pro-
cedures – which are uncoordinated, more time consuming and require more resources – for 
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registering a business.16 Besides this, high entry costs are among the reasons why less devel-
oped countries have a relatively large IS. 
 
Table 2: Number of procedures, time and cost for registering a new business 
Country Number of 
procedures 
Time (days) Cost (US$) Cost (% of income/ 
GNP per capita) 
Sub-Saharan Africa*     
Ethiopia 8 44 422 421 
Kenya 11 61 194 54 
Tanzania 13 35 557 199 
Uganda 17 36 339 135 
Latin America*     
Peru 9 100 510 24 
Nicaragua 12 71 1,335 337 
Bolivia 18 67 1,499 166 
Transition economies**     
Azerbaijan 15 79  19 
Belarus 20 105  16 
Croatia 13 39  17 
Georgia 12 48  39 
Hungary 7 65  64 
Romania 11 133  30 
Kyrgyz Republic 9 22  15 
Western Europe*      
Sweden 3 16 190 1 
Denmark 4 4 0 0 
Source: * IBRD/World Bank, 2003; ** Djankov et al., 2002. 
 
 
Operating Formal Cost 
Operating in the formal sector denotes the involvement of a firm in different societal institu-
tions that entail the following operating formal costs. 
Time consuming. In Peru an employee in the administration department of a small, formal 
firm has to spend about 40 percent of his/her working hours filling out government forms 
(De Soto, 1992).  
Burdensome and complex taxes. Tokman (2001) reports that in Brazil micro-entrepreneurs have 
to pay at least ten different taxes and social insurance contributions, in Columbia seven, and 
eight in Peru. De Soto (1992) indicates that including tax, labour regulations, bureaucratic 
requirements and public utility rates it costs small manufacturing firms in Peru approxi-
mately 348 percent of after tax profit to operate in the formal sector.  
                                                     
16  See De Soto (1992) for a case study on the requirements for the formalisation of a small textile busi-
ness in Lima/Peru.  
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Unaffordable labour regulations. Meeting labour regulations involves cash outflows. In Peru 
full compliance with the labour regulations may result in a decrease of profit of over 50 per-
cent. This deduction can affect 75 percent of formal firms which employ up to ten people 
(Tokman, 2001). In some countries labour regulations appear to be restrictive and costly. In 
India for example, when a woman who has been married for less than 12 months quits her 
job she has the right to receive a severance payment based on her years of service 
(IBRD/World Bank, 2005). It also costs the equivalent of 112 weeks salary to make a worker 
redundant. The majority of micro-enterprises interviewed by Morrisson (1995) in seven de-
veloping countries reported that the legal minimum wage is very high, the drawback being 
that it is fixed; with fluctuating returns, enterprises tend to avoid it.  
Cumbersome property registration and formal loan application. Loan application requires the 
submission of registered assets as collateral and certified financial statements which necessi-
tate the utilisation and payment of accounting consultancy fees. Property registration in the 
majority of developing countries is time consuming and costly involving 21 procedures in 
Abuja compared to only 3 procedures in Helsinki (IBRD/World Bank, 2005). Its complica-
tions and charges are, among other reasons, inflated by the domination of the informal ex-
change of properties as formal exchange is expensive. The process of acquiring communal 
land and an official building permit for residential or business premises takes almost seven 
years in Peru. Yet the ownership of land or premises does not give the owner the right to use 
them as collateral or sell them (De Soto, 1992). The complicated and high costs involved in 
property registration are partly responsible for the accumulation of “dead capital” which is 
inefficiently used to generate income. In Egypt dead capital (i.e. the value of investment in 
real estate) amounts to around US$ 240 billion (De Soto, 2001). 
Inefficient contract enforcement mechanism. Access to security and judicial services for contract 
enforcement is inefficient (Loayza, 1997), entails paperwork, a close follow-up and advice 
from lawyers; all of which call for cash payments. In developing countries the contract en-
forcement procedure is complex and sometimes involves corrupt government officials. In 
Jakarta it costs 126 percent of the debt value to enforce a contract, while in Seoul it is only 
5.4 percent (IBRD/World Bank, 2003). In Guatemala it can take four years to resolve a com-
mercial dispute in court and the outcome is uncertain. 
 
Cost of Informality 
Operating within the IS is not without cost since actors in government institutions and the 
formal sector regard the IS as unofficial. The costs of operating in the IS are as follows: 
Penalties and corruption 
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In most cases the detection of informal enterprises is accompanied by corruption, harass-
ment and the confiscation by government officials of the enterprise’s properties (products 
and assets). For the most part enterprises operate without assurance and have to budget for 
bribery. In Peru around 10 to 15 percent of an enterprises gross income goes towards bribes, 
while formal firms pay about one percent (De Soto, 1992). In transition economies informal 
firms can incur bribes of up to 20 percent of their revenue (Djankov et al., 2002). When gov-
ernment officials benefit from the formalisation process of informal enterprises (for example, 
by receiving bribes), they may in fact retard the formalisation process (Loayza, 1997).  
 
Informality Opportunity Costs 
The opportunity costs of operating in the IS are as follows: 
Limited access to public services. On account of their unofficial status, informal enterprises do 
not have full access to public services. They are poorly protected by the national security 
system and thus subject to many crimes (Loayza, 1997) and high transaction costs related to 
high opportunism from business partners; a situation that may force enterprises to trade 
with people they know, hence limited market and growth potential. 
Avoid profitable expansion. The majority of informal enterprises do not expand or invest in 
modern equipment for they wish to minimize their visibility and avoid attention from gov-
ernment institutions. Remaining small may be the right decision if an enterprise operates in 
a cluster and manages to specialise in specific activities. However, the consequences of stay-
ing small include: the inability to enjoy economies of scale or increase efficiency and com-
petitiveness. Additionally, invisibility implies avoiding profitable markets that can be ac-
cessed through public advertisements. 
Limited access to financial and BDS. Informal enterprises face difficulties in accessing BDS and 
financial services whose provision requires legalised transactions (Loayza, 1997).17 Besides 
this, financial institutions view MSEs as costly and risky. Credit and business promotion 
programs co-ordinated by government institutions also crowd out informal enterprise and 
as a result, these enterprises are forced to depend on informal sources of external financing 
which are sometimes expensive and of a short-term nature. Drawing on Huq and Sultan’s 
(1991) results, Loayza (1997) reports that in 1988 Bangladeshi non-institutional sources of 
finance charged an annual interest rate of around 40 to 100 percent while commercial banks 
only charged about 12 percent.  
Limited possibilities to cooperate with formal enterprises. The participation of informal firms in 
bilateral vertical linkages with formal ones depends on their degree of formality. Indeed, 
                                                     
17  As addressed by Levenson and Maloney (1998), one of the requirements of financial institutions 
for extending funds to business entities is their registration. On the other hand, the government 
asks the financial institutions to report the identity of their business partners for tax purposes. 
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partial formality (e.g. registration by the local authority) seems to increase subcontracting 
arrangements (Milinga and Wells, 2002; Arimah, 2001). A high degree of informality how-
ever may increase informality opportunity costs, such as lost benefits (viz., a reliable market, 
financial support, technology transfer training and supervision of production operations) 
from bilateral vertical linkages. 
 
Informality – Formality Trade-off 
This section briefly summarises factors that may shape a firm’s decision to operate formally 
or informally given formality and informality costs.  
Growth and age of the firm. Levenson and Maloney (1998) view the formalisation of enter-
prises as a process; the entrepreneur decides to formalise the enterprise as it grows, since 
operating formally (i.e. participation in societal institutions) becomes important18 and be-
cause some of the benefits derived by doing so outweigh the costs. On the other hand, access 
to informal societal institutions – social networks/relationships for implicit contract en-
forcement, informal capital market, family, apprentices and casual labour, a mutual ex-
tended network of friends and family for providing insurance for old age and health – may 
be sufficient for a relatively small firm. As a firm grows the provision of fringe and social 
benefits becomes indispensable for attracting good workers (Levenson and Maloney, 1998). 
In addition, the firm needs to use a legally recognised system for enforcing contracts with all 
(known and unfamiliar) business partners (Loayza, 1997) as the utilisation of informal socie-
tal institutions becomes insufficient, unmanageable and in all probability costly. However, 
the benefits of operating in the formal sector are only likely to be realised if the legal frame-
work caters for the needs of MSEs, which is not the case in many developing countries (De 
Soto, 1992).  
Regarding the age of a firm, it is argued that being young is associated with shorter life ex-
pectancy. Thus, younger firms (the majority being informal) may choose not to participate in 
all (or some) societal institutions due to the uncertainty surrounding their future (Levenson 
and Maloney, 1998; Jaeckle and Li, 2003).  
The line of business. Jaeckle and Li (2003) argue that the line of business or sector in which 
firms are involved seems to determine their level of participation in societal institutions. 
They report that firms in the manufacturing sector seem to employ a relatively high number 
of paid workers and operate far from home; while firms in the resale sector utilise more un-
paid workers, operate from fixed premises, are non-home-based and pay some taxes. Thus, 
                                                     
18  Societal institutions include federal and local treasuries, governmental programs such as social 
security (including pension and health care), the legal system, the banking system, health inspec-
tion, firm censuses, trade organisations, civic organisations and so on.  
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compliance with labour regulations seems important for manufacturing firms and less im-
portant for those in the resale sector. 
Priority societal institutions. The literature on the participation of informal firms in societal 
institutions claims that firms appear to choose the institutions and the level/degree of par-
ticipation with them based on the positive net benefits which they provide.19 A study in Peru 
by Jaeckle and Li (2003) revealed that 22 percent of micro enterprises were registered with 
the national treasury, of which 71 percent paid some taxes. Fourteen percent of non-
registered firms also paid taxes. Only 4 percent of those enterprises which had been in busi-
ness for more than three years and utilised paid workers, paid indirect labour costs. A study 
by Levenson and Maloney (1998) on Mexican micro enterprises showed that 42 percent of 
them were registered with the federal treasury, 25 percent were registered with the local 
treasury, 35 percent paid some taxes and 35 percent of those with paid workers had regis-
tered them with the social security administration. Seventy percent of micro enterprises in 
Brazil and 57 percent in Chile made some contributions to labour benefits (Tokman, 2001). 
Morrisson (1995) reported that the majority of enterprises in Algeria with at least 5 employ-
ees, 75 percent of MSEs in Tunisia, and 40 percent of MSEs in Swaziland paid sales tax. 
Anderson (1998) discovered that more than 50 percent of micro-enterprises (taxicabs, kiosks 
and boot repair) in Mongolia are registered with tax authorities, between 13 and 40 percent 
are covered by social insurance, and between 36 and 51 are covered by health insurance. 
Knowledge of anticipated benefits. The trade-off seems to apply to enterprises which have some 
knowledge of formality processes and the need to and benefits of participating in different 
societal institutions. Morrisson (1995) asserted that the majority of unregistered enterprises 
were not aware. ILO (2003) found that some employers and employees in the IS are ignorant 
of the implications of working and employment conditions. 
The level of enforcement exercised by governments. In some cases (e.g. the hygiene and quality 
standards of small restaurants in Tunisia, Thailand and Jamaican cities) where inspections 
and sanctions (penalties or threats) are frequently made, the majority of enterprises tend to 
comply with regulations, which thus enables them to increase their returns. In other cases 
however, (e.g. the quality standards and working conditions in metal work and textile in-
dustries and labour regulations in the majority of enterprises) enterprises do not comply 
with regulations because of the lack of enforcement mechanisms. In addition to this, enter-
prises take advantage of the labour market situation and lack of participation by informal 
workers in unions (Morrisson, 1995; Bass and Kappel, 1997). 
                                                     
19  Some of the institutions are interrelated in that the participation in one may need that of another. 
For example, a firm may need to be registered in order to apply for external financing from formal 
financial institutions. 
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Is Formalisation a Solution? 
Given the current business/economic and regulatory environment in developing countries, 
the opportunity costs of informality seem to be much lower than the cost of operating for-
mally. This is based on the premise that even small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with a 
higher degree of formality still face the same obstacles as those with a higher level of infor-
mality. On the other hand, the cost of operating formally is very high for formal, medium 
firms (Weder, 2003). This discourages MSEs to grow and increase their degree of formality.  
Furthermore, formal firms (particularly small ones) have neither continuous access to the 
economic infrastructural services (e.g. water, electricity, sanitation, telephone services, 
transport system), nor do they receive government investment incentives accessible to the 
large firms (Ishengoma, 2005). The inefficient provision of public and financial services leads 
to high transaction costs. Due to inefficient and poor property right enforcement coupled 
with corruption, most transactions among formal enterprises are coordinated by informal 
networks. Irrespective of their formality, SMEs and large manufacturing firms have limited 
access to long-term loans (Ishengoma, 2005).  
Based on this discussion, total formality may mean closing up the business unless the busi-
ness environment within which firms operate is improved. 
 
 
4. The Informal Sector, Economic Growth and Poverty 
As explained in Section 2, the literature suggests that a negative economic growth rate may 
raise unemployment and poverty. People (mainly women, the disabled and the low edu-
cated) who are retrenched during economic recession, engage in the subsistence informal 
sub-sector. However, some retrenched people engage in transitional/dynamic informal 
MSEs and pursue an entrepreneurial career. Though these entrepreneurs do not belong to 
the community of the poor, some of their employees do.20 Due to the fact that the subsistence 
informal sub-sector dominates employment in the IS and a significant number of employees 
in the dynamic and transition sub-sectors are poor, the majority of people engaged in the IS 
can be considered poor.21 The following paragraphs briefly address the relationship between 
the IS and poverty as well as economic growth. The discussion disregards the direction of 
causality as it runs from both sides and among the three variables. 
                                                     
20  See Orlando (2001) on the average earnings of different categories of employers and employees in 
Venezuela. 
21  See House (1984). Cartaya (1991) cited in Orlando (2001) reveals that poor household members are 
either self-employed or employees in the informal sector. Orlando (2001) also indicates that the in-
comes of families in extreme poverty are mainly from the informal sector. 
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The informal sector and poverty. There are contradicting views regarding the relationship be-
tween poverty and the IS. On one hand, the IS seems to trap its actors in poverty while on 
the other, it contributes to the reduction of poverty. The IS offers jobs that are of low quality, 
have poor employment and working conditions and therefore do not contribute much to 
poverty reduction.22 Among the working population, workers in the IS are poorly remuner-
ated, underemployed, have no social protection; their rights are less respected, and they are 
excluded from social dialogue and decision making. Thus, workers in the IS run a high risk 
of injury and their health is harmed on a daily basis. In the event of injury or illness they 
have no protection or safety net to help them and their families survive on a reduced or cut-
off income (ILO, 2003). Thus, it can be inferred that poverty forces people to engage in the IS 
and working in the IS means poverty.  
By comparing some of the dimensions of employment and working conditions of the formal 
and IS, Orlando (2001) revealed that in 1991 and 1997 earnings per hour in the formal sector 
in Venezuela were 44 and 49 percent higher than in the IS, respectively. Looking at income 
dimensions of poverty the IMF (2004) reported that in Serbia and Montenegro the incidence 
of poverty, relative poverty risk, poverty depth and poverty severity are higher for people 
working in the IS (grey sector) than those in the formal one. The situation is even worse for 
female informal workers whose average earnings are 70 percent less than those of informal 
male workers (Orlando, 2001). 
Contrarily to the view that associates the IS with sustained poverty, Anderson (1998) at-
tempted an answer to the question: how would the poverty situation have looked in the 
absence of the IS? He revealed that in 1996, around 38 percent of households in Ulaan-
baatar/Mongolia had a poverty-level income. In the absence of informal incomes, 53 percent 
of households would have fallen below the official poverty line, which attests to the contri-
bution of the IS to poverty reduction. 
                                                     
22  There are three dimensions of poverty: income poverty includes indicators considering per capita 
income below the poverty line; subjective well-being poverty addresses the views of the people in 
relation to the life they lead, and capability poverty which includes physical functioning (consider-
ing health, literacy, investment/savings) and social functioning, which account for the ability to 
avoid shame, maintain self-respect, and participate in decision making for issues related to the so-
ciety (see Kingdon and Knight, 2003; Habitat, 2000; Sethuraman, 1997; Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004; 
Sen, 1983). Habitat (2000) relates some of the issues addressed under physical functioning to pov-
erty of access (i.e. lack of access to basic infrastructure and services: education, shelter, piped wa-
ter, electricity, wastewater disposal and solid waste collection by government agencies and or-
ganisations). Their definition of poverty of power (i.e. lack of participation in decision making 
within the society) is slightly similar to inadequate social functioning. Nadvi and Barrientos (2004) 
introduce the concept of participation (i.e. poverty of participation) indicated by social and physi-
cal isolation, powerlessness and lack of voice, low social status and physical weakness. From the 
above description, the terms inadequate social functioning, poverty of power and poverty of par-
ticipation, can be used interchangeably. 
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Informal sector and inefficient fiscal policies. As the majority of workers in the IS have no writ-
ten contract, informal enterprises do not give accurate figures of their sales and incomes; the 
income and sales taxes collected therefore are lower than the appropriate amount. In Mon-
tenegro it was expected that the legalisation of 20,000 employees would increase fiscal reve-
nue by EUR 10 million (IMF, 2004). The collection of taxes from informal enterprises is also 
costly. Tax administration in Peru costs 75 percent of the amount collected from the IS 
(Tokman, 2001). As a result, the fiscal revenues amassed by governments are low, a situation 
that limits their ability to offer a reliable and sustainable economic infrastructure and public 
services. Poor provision of these services increases transaction costs, reduces productivity, 
and raises capabilities poverty.  
Beside the problems related to the supply side of the economic infrastructure and social ser-
vices the demand side involves low utilisation of the services by the IS. The negative impli-
cation being a high fixed-cost per service offered, hence a low return on investment and an 
unsustainable provision of the services. Empirical evidence by Loayza (1997) revealed that 
an increase in the size of the IS in Latin America decreased economic growth since it re-
duced the availability of public services23 for everyone in the economy and increased the 
number of activities that inefficiently use some of the public services. 
Formality as an input in production. Scholars (e.g. Levenson and Maloney, 1998; Jaeckle and Li, 
2003) who regard formalisation as the participation of firms in societal institutions view 
formality as a normal input in production determining therefore the level of output and 
growth. This can be addressed from different angles. Formalisation is connected to a higher 
possibility of access to productive resources and full utilisation of public services and the 
economic infrastructure. From the point of view of human resource management24 formal-
ity, which implies respecting labour norms and rights, the participation of IS workers in de-
cision making processes and good working conditions, are part and parcel of human capital 
(an input in the production process) and therefore have positive effects on productivity and 
income through increased worker motivation (ILO, 2003). 
 
 
                                                     
23  Economic growth is estimated according to the average growth rate of real per capita between the 
years 1980-1992. The provision of public services is done by proxy through an index of public in-
frastructure including: per capita electricity consumption, per capita telephone mainlines, access to 
safe water of population per capital, and roads in good condition per capita. 
24  See for example, Maslow’s theory of motivation, behavioural management literature, and goal 
setting theory. 
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5. Strategic Options: Accelerating the Formalisation of Informal Enterprises 
Measures for encouraging the formalisation of informal enterprises need to address: the fac-
tors hindering their growth, the increasing costs of formalisation, and discourage their par-
ticipation in formal societal institutions. This section reviews and assesses the literature and 
measures taken by selected governments, donor agencies and non-governmental institutions 
to accelerate the formalisation process.25  
 
Proposals in Reviewed Literature  
Reformation of Regulatory Framework 
Morrisson (1995) emphasises the need for the reform of regulatory frameworks in accelerat-
ing the formalisation of informal enterprises. Starting with the registration process, he rec-
ommends that it should take at most two hours, require the minimum number of docu-
ments, and cost less than US$ 2. Some scholars (e.g. Tokman, 2001; Becker, 2004) propose the 
need to have a one stop-shop which integrates all the procedures required for business reg-
istration in order to cut down entry cost, to avoid overlapping and contradictory regula-
tions, and to facilitate the provision of information. 
While Tokman (2001) addresses the need for the actors in the IS to adopt a business oriented 
attitude, Morrisson (1995) highlights the need for government officials to change their arro-
gant behaviour towards those in the IS. To solve this problem, legislation which would rec-
ognise the IS, empower actors within the IS and create awareness which would enable them 
to demand their rights and deal with government officials’ inappropriate behaviour, may 
need to be enacted (Becker, 2004). Furthermore, government officials may need to be sensi-
tised to the importance of the IS. 
Regarding labour regulations, the formalisation of informal firms may require dual/multiple 
labour regulations (i.e. specific regulations for specific informal sub-categories) so as to en-
able those who can meet part of the social contributions to do so instead of not complying at 
all or closing up their businesses and in that way increasing unemployment and poverty. 
Morrisson (1995) addresses the need for dual minimum wage-legislation which would be 
structured in accordance with the size of businesses; informal enterprises may be subject to a 
lower minimum wage. He emphasises also the need for double safety nets for which micro-
enterprises could pay certain percentages of social security funds (e.g. 5 percent) and states 
could cover the rest. He recommends this system because it has produced satisfactory re-
sults in Ecuador. India is also considering the implementation of dual wage-legislation in 
                                                     
25  Poverty alleviation strategies are also part and parcel of measures targeting the informal sector. 
However, they are beyond the objectives of this paper since it focuses on enterprises. 
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order to improve the effectiveness of the social security system (Becker, 2004). Tokman 
(2001) however, disagrees with this proposal as it may discourage business growth among 
micro-enterprises and government regulations may no longer treat workers equally. Ac-
cording to his views, common labour regulations seem the best option even in the absence of 
compliance capabilities. However, with a large percentage of non-compliance, atypical and 
precarious employment, workers are already unequally treated before the law. 
As regards the fiscal system, Levenson and Maloney (1998) argue that the benefits accrued 
by firms participating in societal institutions are not homogeneous and thus, the payment of 
universal levies charged by governments might not be appropriate. Morrisson (1995) pro-
poses that all taxes (except local levies) need to be merged so as to reduce the cost of collec-
tion and the disturbance to enterprises, while local levies may be transformed into fees for 
community resources, viz., marking location, equipped industrial plants and infrastructure. 
This, together with the involvement of MSEs in decision making processes in their commu-
nities may increase the accountability and transparency of local government authorities. He 
adds that the subsistence IS needs to be granted tax exemption for an agreed period and 
afterwards charged a lower flat rate for the subsequent period before graduating into a rela-
tively higher income group. 
 
Improving Access to Productive Resources and the Market to Informal Enterprises 
Another way to increase the participation of informal enterprises in the formal sector is the 
reduction in the magnitude of factors that limit their growth (Becker, 2004; Tokman, 2001; 
Morrisson, 1995). Proposals include: the improvement of access for the IS to BDS and finan-
cial services.  
Additionally, scholars (see Morrisson, 1995; Becker, 2004) suggest the enactment and im-
provement of legislation facilitating the accessibility of informal enterprises to productive 
resources. These include the efficient provision of property title deeds (IBRD/World Bank, 
2005) which would be possible if the provision of title deeds recognised property ownership 
based on long-term use – given the informal exchange of properties (Tokman, 2001). More-
over, governments need to acknowledge informal popular rules for secure property rights 
(De Soto, 2001). De Soto argues that property rights have to grow from bottom up and this 
needs to be encouraged and taken up by governments as massive informality develops 
when the law fails to coincide with the way people live and work. The government of Sri 
Lanka has acknowledged this and already started to set up land titling and to provide legal 
tenure to families for the land they have lived and worked on (Becker, 2004). The provision 
of title deeds offers poor people the right to use their properties in efficient and legally se-
cured market transactions (De Soto, 2001). This may enable them to relate freely to govern-
ment and private businesses without fear and enjoy protection against uncertainty and 
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fraud. It may also encourage them to upgrade their properties. Indeed, without legal owner-
ship, most assets are economically and financially invisible. 
On the matter of business location, Morrisson (1995) emphasises that all business actors, 
whether in micro or large enterprises, should have equal chances to operate in good loca-
tions provided they abide by the rules governing these localities. Tokman (2001) suggests 
that informal enterprises (e.g. street vendors) need to be provided with permanent places for 
their activities in accordance with municipal regulations. He adds that such places need to 
be well served by the public transport system in order to enhance their markets. 
 
Promotion of Informal-formal Sector Forward and Multilateral Linkages 
When firms in the IS participate in bilateral vertical linkages with firms in the formal sector, 
they may benefit from a reliable market, financial support, technology transfer and training 
and supervision. However, the majority of informal firms are excluded from these linkages. 
Measures which governments may take to promote linkages include: first, the reservation of 
a significant percentage of public orders for those micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSME) that comply with the regulations. This may encourage increased formalisation of 
MSMEs.26 Second, to address the exploitative nature of formal-IS linkages and to enhance 
the institutional environment through which these linkages operate (Sethuramann, 1997). 
This can be done by increasing the number of suppliers and buyers linked to informal en-
terprises and excluding the middlemen who add no value to the transaction process. Sri 
Lanka for example, is considering establishing regional markets to enable farmers to sell 
directly to final buyers (Becker, 2004). Some regulations may be put in place to govern sub-
contracting arrangements so as to reduce the exploitation of informal enterprises by large 
enterprises. Third, the creation and enhancement of business associations which foster the 
interests of informal enterprises; such associations may increase the bargaining power of 
members during negotiations with other stakeholders, offer information, resolve conflicts 
among members, and facilitate the provision of security services.27 They also offer BDS in 
advanced clusters.28 Workers in informal enterprises also need to organise themselves 
within their unions while the governance structures of existing associations need to be en-
hanced too. 
                                                     
26  Eighty percent of micro enterprises in Ecuador are registered and comply with some labour regu-
lations to have access to public orders (Morrisson, 1995). 
27  Sethuramann (1997) reports the success of the association of rickshaw operators (pullers) in India 
in managing to acquire the ownership of assets (vehicles) they utilised. The creation of the associa-
tion was facilitated by a local NGO (Industrial Service Institute) but the success of the movement 
was sabotaged by other stakeholders and the Government’s failure to coordinate relevant policies 
and regulations.  
28  Examples of BDS include the provision of technical services, training, and facilitating the market-
ing process. 
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Practical Measures 
The view that the IS is a temporary phenomenon which may disappear as the economy 
grows, (and therefore does not require government intervention since it may lead to market 
distortion), is refuted by the increase in the size of the IS despite economic growth. This has 
triggered initiatives by governments and other stakeholders related to the promotion and 
formalisation of the IS. The sections below address selected initiatives some of which (e.g. 
Shanghai Municipal Government, the National Productivity Institute [NPI] in South Africa, 
and Self-Employed Women’s Association [SEWA]) are among those identified by ILO as the 
best international practices.29 Radio Programming and Journalism is an emerging approach 
supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) that creates awareness 
and educates MSMEs through the media.30 
 
Government Initiatives 
China. The reorganisation of public enterprises in China has resulted in massive redundancy 
among workers (see Howell 2002). The Shanghai Municipal Government has set up a pro-
gramme to assist retrenched workers form individual labour organisations.31 In cooperation 
with volunteer experts, it tries to enhance the growth and development of these organisa-
tions.  
To speed up the registration process and assist informal enterprises, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government established special administrative organs known as Employment Service Or-
ganisations (ESO) at different levels: city, district, county and street committee. The Street 
Committee Employment Service Organ (SCESO) provides the seal of approval for the for-
mation of a business, it registers employees, assists in setting up bank accounts, issues re-
ceipts, and organises data collection for the higher authorities. It also offers technical assis-
tance, training, advice on relevant government legislation and for the formulation of busi-
ness plans. It provides an arena for negotiations between informal contractors and their cli-
ents. Moreover, it acts as a guarantor for informal labour organisations applying for bank 
loans and as a representative of these organisations during the discussion with government 
institutions. Thus, SCESO is similar to a business association for informal enterprises.  
                                                     
29  De Medina, in: http://decon.edu.uy/eventos/diez.ppt. 
30  It is important to note that some of the initiatives addressed are based on the information from 
donors’ policy papers which may not offer a clear understanding of what is being implemented on 
the ground. Furthermore, the information on how effective and successful these initiatives are is 
insufficient. 
31  Individual labour organisations are like informal enterprises that offer services, whose provision is 
dominated by labour input and insignificant investment in physical assets. They are not registered 
with the Industrial and Commercial Bureau though they are recognised by the Shanghai Munici-
pal Government. 
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The Government also issued special protective measures to augment informal labour or-
ganisations and guarantee decent employment. These measures include preferential policies 
for their participation in basic social insurance schemes, free training for employers and em-
ployees in the IS, preferential tax policies (exemption from local taxes for a period of three 
years), risk insurance and credit supports. The informal labour organisations pay some 
amount of risk insurance of which 50 percent is covered by the Government. Established 
cooperative linkages between the Government and banks facilitate the provision of credit. 
The Government has also set up around 57 points in the city where informal labour organi-
sations can apply for start-up loans with the City Employment Promotion Fund as guaran-
tor. Among the conditions for receiving a loan is the assurance of the creation of new jobs. 
Despite these governmental initiatives however, a survey conducted on 500 informal or-
ganisations in Shanghai revealed that 25 percent reported that their formalisation was hin-
dered due to the strictness of the governmental requirements; only 25 percent had converted 
into formal businesses. 
South Africa. High unemployment and inequality forced the South African Government to 
reshape its private sector promotion strategies and to give special attention to MSMEs and 
the disadvantaged population.32 In 1994 a national small business strategy was formulated 
to create an enabling environment for SMEs, to facilitate the equalisation of income, wealth 
and economic opportunities, to create long-term jobs, to strengthen networking among 
small enterprises, to level the playing fields between big and small business, and to support 
MSMEs’ international competitiveness.33  
The NPI is a unit under the Government’s Department of Labour which aims to improve the 
productivity of MSMEs and to facilitate their linkages with the formal sector and markets.34 
In order to meet its objectives, the NPI offers productivity training and facilitates linkage 
creation using an insourcing model. Regarding the provision of productivity training the 
NPI has introduced its productivity concepts at different levels of the education system: vo-
cational training centres, schools and universities. It links training institutions to MSMEs 
which has resulted in some university students carrying out their practical assignments in 
MSMEs and trying to solve the problems faced by MSMEs. It conducts workshops on pro-
ductivity awareness, endeavours to reach specific markets and also offers productivity train-
ing to owners and employees. In 2002 it reached 240 MSMEs and poverty alleviation projects 
                                                     
32  In 1995 households in the top quintile had incomes more than 7.63 times the incomes of house-
holds in the lowest quintile but by 2000 the ratio had dropped to 5.78. In 2003, the ‘broad’ unem-
ployment rate (i.e. people who want to work but have been discouraged) was 42.1 percent (Gelb, 
2004).  
33  See www.polity.org.za/html. 
34  See www.nedlac.org.za/links/gov.html, www.npi.co.za/home.htm. 
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offering awards to the best practicing firms, encouraging MSMEs to increase their produc-
tivity. 
As regards the creation of linkages through the in-sourcing model, the NPI has been in-
volved in several projects (e.g. National Social Plans) with the aim of creating jobs and re-
employing retrenched workers. It organises retrenched employees into business groups 
which tender for the supplying of services outsourced by their former employers.35 In 2002 it 
assisted NEHAWU retrenched employees in organising themselves to run student restau-
rants and to get employment in enterprises that won tenders to supply cleaning and horti-
cultural services. This initiative saved 140 jobs out of 217 and also helped 10 community 
based projects to assume their business status. The NPI is also involved in projects aimed at 
improving working conditions but there is lack of information on its success. 
 
Donor agency and Private Initiatives 
The initiatives of donor agencies in the IS are part of their private sector development strate-
gies (PSD). Examples of specific donor agencies are: 
Sida. The reviewed micro-enterprises’ programs supported by Sida focus on the supplying 
of micro-financing, infrastructure development, the enhancement of market access, the crea-
tion of awareness of BDS for MSEs and providing education through the media.36 The Pro-
gram for Local Development (Sida/Natur) in Nicaragua allocates community grants for the 
provision of infrastructure, offers micro-credits to micro-enterprises and housing loans to 
poor families. Micro-credits to small businesses have enabled the working poor (particularly 
home-based women-owned businesses) to strengthen and develop their economic activities. 
It is reported that some have been able to expand the range and quality of products offered 
to their clients, others have increased sales and created employment. The housing loan pro-
gram brought about an increase in the family ownership of title deeds from 15 percent in 
1994 to over 70 percent in 2001. To enhance market access, FONDEAGO (Sida/Natur) facili-
tates the production and marketing of coffee and other commercial products produced by 
small farmers in two departments in Nicaragua. It also offers credit and training and assists 
in the registration of land. 
Sida, in cooperation with ILO, has introduced a Radio Programming and Journalism initia-
tive targeting MSEs in Uganda. The program offers marketing information (Hitchins et al., 
2004) to create public awareness of BDS (Becker, 2004), holds technical discussions to edu-
                                                     
35  Kirsten and Rorgerson (2002) describe this as the insourcing model of linkages which refers to the 
creation of in-house opportunities targeted at formally disadvantaged staff. They report that the 
Southern Sun group hotels, through its insourcing program initiated in 1994 have 29 insourcing 
groups. 
36  See Becker (2004) on detailed information regarding these programs.  
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cate MSEs and help them solve their problems, and gives interviews with successful busi-
ness operators (Hitchins et al., 2004). The first radio program was launched in 1999 and by 
2004 22 radio programs were broadcast in 12 local languages on 18 radio stations (i.e. 21 per-
cent of the total radio stations) (FIT-SEMA, 2004). The radio program is considered success-
ful since it reaches around two thirds of Uganda’s poorest members aged 15 years and 
above and helps to resolve business conflicts (FIT-SEMA, 2004). However, the air time pro-
vided to address income generation, agriculture and health issues is not enough and issues 
under discussion were not sufficiently covered or followed up. 
SEWA. SEWA is an association of poor, self-employed women and workers in the IS.37 It was 
registered in 1972 and grew out of the Textile Labour Association becoming independent in 
1981. As its members have no formal employers, it does not campaign against them. Its main 
objectives are to achieve greater employment, income, food and nutrition, housing/assets, 
and better health and child care for its members. It also tries to enhance organisational 
strength, leadership and self-reliance. The members of SEWA include hawkers and vendors 
(9 percent); home-based workers such as weavers and potters (34 percent); and manual la-
bourers and service providers (57 percent).38 
SEWA is said to be successful in accessing workers in the IS for in 2003 its total membership 
was seven hundred thousand.39 Other organisations (in South Africa for example) face diffi-
culties in accessing these workers since they fear loosing their jobs if they were to be recog-
nised by their employers (Goldman, 2003). This is exacerbated by high unemployment and 
the threat of the quick substitution of a worker for a job seeker. SEWA handles this problem 
by creating more employment opportunities through organising un(der)employed workers 
into co-operatives, increasing their bargaining power and access to business opportunities.40 
Crowley et al. (2005) report on SEWA’s success in formalising waste pickers by unionising 
and supporting them in marketing collected waste, and encouraging them to upgrade and 
diversify their skills. This may enable them to create co-operatives in other lines of business 
and to raise and sustain their employment. In 2000 it sponsored more than 80 co-operatives 
covering different areas of production and services (Bhowmik, 2005). 
Steps undertaken by SEWA to provide banking services, housing funds, health care, child 
care, insurance, legal aid, capacity building and marketing of members’ products through 
the internet, trade-fairs and different international contacts may result in the improvement 
of workers’ conditions and the formalisation process (Sudarshan, 2002). A good number of 
                                                     
37  See www.sewa.org/aboutus/index.htm. 
38  The latter group includes: agricultural labourers, construction workers, contract labourers, hand-
cart pullers, head-loaders, and domestic workers. 
39  See SEWA, in: www.sewa.org/annualreport/ind.htm. 
40  See www.sewa.org/aboutus/index.htm ? organisation ? organisation in rural areas. 
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artisans have managed to exhibit their textile products in France. Co-operatives for health-
services and child care provide services for the poor and formal employment for their mem-
bers.  
 
Assessment of Proposed Measures and Practical Examples 
The literature addresses measures that can be taken to lessen the misuse of public funds, to 
raise local-level accountability, and to encourage the participation of informal enterprises in 
societal organisations. However, it does not explicitly emphasise the need for the improve-
ment in quality of the economic infrastructure and public services which also explain the 
degree of firms’ formality.41 In the majority of low income countries, the rural areas are still 
disconnected from urban areas which limit rural-urban economic integration, growth and 
formalisation. There are still no measures suggested for improving accountability, effective-
ness and efficiency at the national-level. 
Formalisation and poverty reduction are related to the use of formal labour which empha-
sises the need to address employment and working conditions in the IS. The literature ad-
dresses the issue of dual labour legislation, particularly minimum wage and social insurance 
but it is unclear how other issues should be dealt with. The Shanghai Municipal Govern-
ment approach to providing social insurance services to informal workers (firms pay a cer-
tain percentage and the Government subsidises the rest) seems to be a good method. Or-
ganisations such as ILO have started to address these issues whilst acknowledging the lack 
of information available on how to deal with them (ILO, 2003). Some measures taken by 
global lead firms in cooperation with NGOs campaigning for fair trade aim at shaping the 
firms of the developing countries linked to them. They offer better prices to improve the 
working and employment conditions of firms in developing countries; donor agencies and 
governments may need to encourage this approach.  
In China the uniqueness of the Shanghai Municipal Government’s approach to business fi-
nancial issues is its assistance in risk insurance, the provision of loan guarantee services, and 
the presence of cooperative relationships between the government and loan providers. 
However, the condition of creating new jobs may limit the access of firms to financial ser-
vices, since the majority of them are unsure of their future success at such an early stage. An 
alternative condition which could be applied is the improvement in productivity which may 
enhance the growth of a firm and increase formalisation. 
In South Africa, the NPI approach seems sustainable and long-term in nature as its produc-
tivity training is integrated in the education system. However, its success in relation to the 
                                                     
41  Yu (2002) also observes a general lack of studies addressing the question of infrastructure. 
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formalisation of MSMEs is based on an insignificant percentage of participants and therefore 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions. 
Sida programs apparently increase the formality of MSEs through the formalisation of prop-
erty (land and house) ownership. Their accessibility to productive resources such as loans 
may increase as their (owned) property can be used as collateral. The provision of housing 
loans and the discussion of health issues on small radio programs focus on the living condi-
tions of the poor and therefore may reduce poverty. The programs try to resolve conflicts 
between local governments and MSEs, facilitate contract enforcement and enhance market 
access to MSEs. They also create awareness of various technical issues relating to MSE op-
erations. However, the programs have not yet covered policy issues (e.g. legal, tax) or 
strengthened MSEs’ and informal workers’ associations. The evaluation of the programs is 
based on a qualitative analysis and it is not possible to delineate the extent to which they 
have impacted on the growth of MSEs and facilitated linkage between BDS providers and 
MSEs. 
The SEWA movement has gained national and international popularity with organisations 
in Yemen, Turkey and South Africa trying to copy it. Its political achievements include the 
set-up of a national commission of labour which evaluates the current labour legislation and 
proposes amendments to cover informal workers. Its founder Elaben Bhatt is a member of 
this commission. Thus, SEWA seems to influence government policies by lobbying for poli-
cies favourable to its members. 
While some case studies and SEWA’s 2003 annual report42 confirm its success based on in-
creasing membership, a quantitative and representative empirical study analysing the rela-
tionship between its membership and the livelihoods of the poor workers is lacking. The 
sustainability of its activities is also questionable given the limited contributions from its 
members. In 2003 it received less than 3 percent of the funds from its own members, 76 per-
cent came from donors, 8 percent from Central and 6 percent from the State (Crowley et al., 
2005). Although membership-based organisations for the poor can provide a point of entry 
for donors who want to support bottom-up initiatives aimed at formalising informal enter-
prises and workers, a high dependence on donor funds may weaken the ownership and 
accountability of the organisations to their members. 
Researchers from the Rural Institutions and Participation Service of the FAO highlight the 
probable consequences of the dependence of MBOP’s (membership-based organisation of 
the poor) on donor funding and their views support the above arguments (Crowley et al., 
2005). They categorise MBOP into those initiated by the poor and those established by do-
nors. The former represent a more reliable basis for strong and lasting solidarity but are 
                                                     
42  See SEWA, in: www.sewa.org/annualreport/ind.htm. 
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sometimes limited in scale and in the diversity of their activities. The latter are often easier 
for outside organisations to work with, better documented, and have more resources but are 
often less stable and run the risk of loosing their pro-poor focus, autonomy and effective-
ness. The presence of the latter in a society may weaken the development of the former, 
which are more genuine. Those organisations founded primarily to tap outside resources are 
unsustainable. The success of MBOP is said to depend on the participation of the poor peo-
ple themselves by collectively defining the objectives and maintaining an equity stake in the 
organisation (i.e. making a significant contribution). 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
The quest to formalisation enterprises needs to be addressed from various different angles, 
viz., reducing entry and operating formal costs, increasing the incentives for MSEs to oper-
ate formally, reducing obstacles to their growth, and searching for inexpensive approaches 
through which to enforce compliancy with government regulations. This can be achieved by 
undertaking the following measures.  
The reduction of entry costs can be accomplished by having a one stop-shop for registration, 
decreasing registration procedures, and increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of offices 
involved in the registration process. Following the approach of the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, the one-stop-shop can be organised at different levels namely local, munici-
pal/district, regional and national. At local level the one-stop-shop may need to facilitate the 
registration process by providing enterprises with all the information, helping them to meet 
all the registration requirements; while the hostile behaviour of government officials to-
wards informal enterprises should be outlawed. 
The national tax system needs to be well structured, clear and transparent. Local levies may 
be transformed into fees for the use of community resources in order to encourage the effi-
cient provision of local public services and accountability. Measures aimed at enhancing 
national-level accountability need to be taken.  
Straightforward property right registration and efficient contract enforcement mechanisms 
which recognise and incorporate informal, popular rules need to be brought into the process 
of securing property rights. Ways to link multilateral private governance structures and the 
formal judicial system in relation to contract enforcement may have to be found to simplify 
the process, increase its effectiveness and efficiency and improve its reach to all business 
operators. The small radio programs in Uganda demonstrate that disputes between the 
Council and MSEs can be resolved. 
Ishengoma/Kappel: Economic Growth and Poverty 34 
 
Dual labour regulations and safety nets are necessary to enable informal enterprises to meet 
part of their labour contributions while staying in business and offering employment. The 
introduction of dual safety nets for this purpose (whereby informal enterprises pay a certain 
percentage and the rest is covered by governments through their poverty reduction strate-
gies) would be necessary. Informal enterprises may need to be sensitised to the need of im-
proving employment and working conditions. This needs to be incorporated into training 
programs that target Informal enterprises. NGOs, local public governance structures, infor-
mal labour associations in cooperation with local and global lead firms need to encourage 
fair trade labelling. 
Following the South African approach, training concepts for informal enterprises need to be 
introduced in vocational training programs. Students following these programs can be as-
signed to informal enterprises in order to conduct their practical tasks which would enable 
them to learn more as future entrepreneurs and facilitate the solving of problems faced by 
informal enterprises. The diversification of products offered by financial institutions may 
need to incorporate security insurance and the establishment of limited liability institutions 
to encourage high return-high risk investment. The provision of BDS and financial services 
needs to be very realistic and objectively evaluated. 
Training programs designed for MSMEs may need to incorporate modules focusing on im-
proving worker capabilities. Employers should be encouraged to allow their employees to 
attend training courses which in turn may also increase their employment potential. 
It is important to encourage the creation of informal-formal sector forward linkages. Meas-
ures to overcome exploitation need to be considered. Actors who add no value in the chain 
linking informal and formal firms need to be removed which can be done by facilitating the 
creation of direct links between value adding informal and formal enterprises. 
The formalisation of informal enterprises can be viewed as an empowerment process and a 
poverty reduction strategy when considering capabilities poverty for it entails legal/official 
recognition of the living conditions of the poor and their sources of income. This can be pos-
sible if the voices of employers and employees in the IS are empowered. If the actors of the 
IS participate in decision making and the formulation of policies/regulations they may in 
turn be motivated to comply with them. Increased formalisation requires incentives that is 
to say; the provision of public and infrastructural services needs to be obvious, efficient, re-
liable and cheaper. 
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